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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ALICE M. ALFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 880312
vs.
THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES
AND TOWNS, an unincorporated
association, JAN T. FURNER,
KENNETH H. BULLOCK, CAROL A.
KOTLER, MICHELE REILLY, JAMI
ADAMSON, JACK A. RICHARDS and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
individuals,

Argument Priority
Classification 14(b)

Defendants-Respondents•

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court
pursuant to 78-2-2 (3) (i), Utah Code Annotated in that
this is an appeal from an Order granting defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, which Order was made by
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, on the 8th
day of July, 1988.

The Court of Appeals does not have

original appellate jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.
THE COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO ISSUE A
BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS
FOR GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 52(a)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
THE COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
III.
APPELLANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE
PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.
IV.
IF RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO CLAIM
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, IT WAS ABUSED.
V.
APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY
WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
VI.
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
on June 13, 1988 (R91).

The Memorandum in support of

their Motion contained four different grounds on which
respondents claimed they were entitled to summary

judgment. (R92-121)
The Motion was heard and argued on July 8, 1988
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.

At the

conclusion of argument of counsel, Judge Wilkinson
orally granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment
without further statement or identification as to
grounds (R314).

Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal

on August 5, 1988. (R317)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah League of Cities and Towns is an
organization formed by the municipalities of the State
of Utah pursuant to the Interlocal Co-operation Act,
11-13-1, et

seq., Utah Code Annotated.

Appellant became an employee of the League on
or about May 16, 1983.

During her employment, she

assumed various responsibilities in connection with the
League's operation and management.

In 198 6, appellant

served as Director of Administrative Services and
reported directly to respondent Jan T. Furner.
On October 3, 1986, respondent Furner
terminated appellant's employment with the League.

The

reason for termination listed on the separation notice
was "insubordination and unwillingness to work with

co-workers".

(All of the above are allegations in

appellant's Complaint and admitted by respondents. R3,
4, 30)
Appellant retained Vincent C. Rampton as her
counsel to inquire into the specifics of the
allegations in her separation notice.

On

October 16, 1986, Mr. Rampton wrote a letter to the
President of the League stating that the termination
and reasons expressed therefor had "severly prejudiced
her in her ability to find employment elsewhere, and
have damaged her reputation generally in the
community".

Mr. Rampton requested specific instances

of insubordination and unwillingness to work with
co-workers sufficient to justify appellant's
termination and also requested a formal hearing before
the Board of Directors of the Utah League of Cities and
Towns,

(R254, 255)
By letter to Mr. Rampton dated

October 22, 1986, Jack A. Richards, general counsel of
the League, mailed a report from respondent Furner
which supposedly justified the termination of the
appellant.

(R293, 294)

By return letter to Mr. Richards dated
October 23, 1986, Mr. Rampton criticized the Furner

report as being unresponsive and inadequate for the
Board to base a decision.

Mr. Rampton also notified

Mr. Richards that the appellant would be represented at
the Board meeting on October 24, 1986, for the purpose
of responding to the charges in Furner's report.
(R295)
At the Board of Directors' meeting held on
October 24, 1986, appellant was represented by counsel,
Thomas P. Melloy.

He was there to set a date for a

special hearing to consider the appellant's termination
and also to discuss the procedures by which the hearing
would go forward.

The minutes from the meeting of the

Board of Directors state that "Mr. Melloy asked for a
copy of all written statements originally requested by
Mr. Rampton from staff and Mr. Furner.

Mr. Melloy

agreed that the statements should also be distributed
to Board members; so they would be prepared for the
November 10, 1986 meeting".
those minutes is disputed.

(R298) The accuracy of
Mr. Melloy specifically

denied agreeing that statements should be distributed
in advance to the Board members.

(Melloy Affidavit

R257-260)
Written statements concerning appellant had
been obtained from the other respondents by the

respondent Furner before appellant's termination.

All

other respondents, excluding Jack A. Richards, were
co-workers of appellant.

These initial statements were

not prepared to support the termination of appellant or
to be used as evidence at any termination hearing.
After the October 24, 1986 Board meeting, supplemental
statements were solicited on the basis that earlier
written statements were not specific enough.

(Michele

Reilly deposition, pages 5 & 6; Kenneth Bullock
deposition, pages 7 & 8; Carol Kotler deposition, pages
8 & 9; Jami Adamson deposition, page 6 ) 1

The written

statement of the respondent Furner was not prepared at
anyone's request, but in anticipation of a subsequent
Board of Directors' hearing.

(Jan Furner deposition,

pages 4 8 & 4 9 ) 1
The written statements claim, among other
things, that appellant:
1.

On one or more occasions, appeared at
public League functions in a severe
stage of intoxication so as to be
unable to speak;

2.

On one or more occasions, reported to
work with a hangover;

3.

Was mentally unstable and unable to

control her behavior;
4.

Circulated deliberate falsehoods about
co-workers in an attempt to cause them
to lose their employment with the
League; and,

5.

Circulated derogatory statements
regarding co-workers' personal habits
and falsely attributed the statements
to respondent Furner.

(Exhibits to

respondents' depositions)Appellant denied the truthfulness or accuracy of each
of the allegations.

(Appellant's deposition, pages

14-16) 1
These statements were thereafter delivered to
the League's Board of Directors by the respondent
Jack A. Richards.

(Jack Richards deposition, page 7 ) .

It was assumed that all depositions and exhibits
had been filed with Judge Wilkinson in connection
with respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Numerous references to the depositions and exhibits
were made in the parties' memorandums. It was only
when the record was withdrawn to prepare this brief
that it was learned that the depositions and
exhibits had never been filed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Wilkinson failed to issue a brief written
statement of the grounds for the Court's decision in
granting respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment as
required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
There were factual issues and disputes in this
case which should have been decided by a fact-finder.
Appellant's counsel's request to the League for
information upon which her termination was based was
not a consent to defamatory statements.

It was an

honest inquiry into the reason for her termination.
Any qualified privilege that may have been
available to the respondents was abused because the
statements were made out of spite, ill will or a desire
to do her harm.
These respondents were not engaged in
governmental activities so at the time this action was
commenced, appellant was not required to comply with
the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
The Board of Directors of the League is not a
judicial or quasi judicial body entitled to solicit and
receive defamatory statements and, thereby, clothe
respondents with a defense of absolute privilege.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT ERRORED BY FAILING TO ISSUE A
BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS
FOR GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 52(a)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
The trial court need not enter
findings of fact and conclusions
of law in rulings on motions,
except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue
a brief written statement of the
ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b),
50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one
ground.
Respondents• Motion for Summary Judgment was
filed pursuant to Rule 56.

They based their Motion on

four different grounds, all of which were separate and
distinct.

All had different factual allegations and

each required a separate legal analysis.
At the conclusion of oral argument and without
further identification or articulation as to grounds or
reasons, Judge Wilkinson granted respondents' Motion.
Appellant was left to guess at the reason or reasons,
preventing her from being able to clearly identify any
specific issue for appeal or focus on any particular

legal or factual dispute.
On appellate review, this Court is also left to
guess whether Judge Wilkinson's granting of the Motion
was possibly based on faulty legal logic or failure to
identify factual issues.
II.
THE COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The Court of Appeals has recently summarized
the standards for motions for summary judgment.

In

Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 95 UAR 19 (Utah
App. 1988) , the Court stated:
Rule 56 (c) authorizes the entry
of summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law". In considering
a motion for summary judgment,
it is not appropriate for a
court to weigh the evidence or
assess credibility; the sole
initial inquiry is whether
there is a genuine issue of
material fact. W.M. Barnes Co.
v. Sohio Natural Resources Co.,
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981).
Furthermore, it only takes one
sworn statement to dispute the
averments on the other side of
the controversy and create such

an issue. Id,; Lucky Seven Rodeo
Corp, v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752
(Utah App. 1988). At page 21.
The Court went on to say:
Because disposition of a case on
summary judgment denies the benefit
of a trial on the merits, this court
must review the facts and reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the losing party.
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank,
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). If,
after doing so, we conclude there
is a dispute as to a material issue
of fact, we must reverse the trial
court's determination and remand for
trial on that issue. Id.; Hardy v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 89 UAR 34, 36
(Utah App. 1988) At page 21.
There are numerous factual issues in dispute
and fair inferences that may be drawn from facts not
in dispute, all of which should be decided by a jury.
III.
APPELLANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE
PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.
There is a factual dispute as to whether
appellant's counsel, Thomas P. Melloy, requested or
approved the distribution of the written statements
from the various League employees to the Board of
Directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns.
issue should be decided by a jury.
Even if it were decided that

This

Vincent C. Rampton's letters to the respondents dated
October 16, 1986 or October 23, 1986, or that
Mr. Melloy, requested the written statements containing
the defamatory material, it would still not raise to
the type of consent which would constitute a defense
for respondents.
In their Memorandum in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment, respondents quoted Prosser, Law
of Torts for authority that appellant's request for
information constituted her consent to defamation.
That same section quoted by the respondents also says:
At the same time, of course, it is
not every request to speak which
manifests consent to slander, and
an honest inquiry as to what is
meant, or an investigation in good
faith to find out what the defendant
has been saying, will not bar the
action, even though it is for the
ultimate purpose of vindication at
law. Prosser Law of Torts, Fourth
Edition, Chapter 19, Defamation,
Sec. 114.
Respondents also relied upon 50 Am. Jur.2d,
Libel and Slander, Section 149.

The most recent

supplement to that Section cited the Restatement,
Torts (Second), Section 584:
Honest inquiry by plaintiff
concerning a defamatory
publication does not constitute
defense to action for
publication.

Cited also in Am. Jur. is Frank B. Hall and
Company v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d, 612 (1984, Tex. App.
Houston 14th Dist.).

In Buck, the Court allowed the

jury to determine whether or not the publication of
defamatory statements about an employee concerning the
reasons for his termination were invited by the
employee sending an investigator to find out the exact
reasons why his employer had fired him.
There is a series of cases which by analogy
suggest that appellant did not consent to this
defamation.

These cases generally hold that an

employer who makes defamatory statements to an employee
knowing that the employee would have to himself publish
the defamatory statements to new prospective employers
did not amount to a consentual or invited publication
and, therefore, remained actionable slander.
v

See Lewis

- Equitable Life Assur. S o c , 389 N.W.2d 876 (1986

Minn.); Nabors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic
Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822 (1985, Mo. App.); First State
Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (1980, Tex. Civ. App.
Corpus Christi); and Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d
389 (1969 Mich.).
In Grist, the Court held that the jury could
find publication of slander by the defendant company

even though the plaintiff herself had communicated the
slanderous statements to a third party.

The plaintiff

claimed that she had been discharged by the defendant
for unfounded reasons and that she was compelled to
repeat those reasons to perspective employers when they
questioned her concerning past employment.

The Court

went on to say that even though the plaintiff herself
had caused the defamatory statements to be published,
the defendant had reason to know that that information
would come to the knowledge of a third person and,
therefore, the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff
was not in error.
The October 16, 1986 letter from
Vincent C. Rampton to respondents was nothing more than
an honest inquiry on the part of appellant into the
specific reasons for her termination which, in her
opinion, were defamatory by alleging insubordination
and unwillingness to work with co-workers.

That

inquiry cannot be held as a matter of law to constitute
a consent to publication.
The October 23, 1986 correspondence from
Mr. Rampton did not request additional information, but
even if it could be inferred that additional
information was being requested, it was nothing more

than an extension of the prior inquiry into the reasons
for appellant's termination.

In any event, neither of

those letters ask that the information be communicated
to anyone other than appellant and her counsel.
There is a dispute as to what was said at the
October 24, 1986 meeting and whether it was a consent
to publication.

Mr. Melloy denied agreeing to the

distribution of any written statements to the Board of
Directors.

That dispute alone should be sufficient to

allow this case to go to the jury.
IV.
IF RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO CLAIM
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, IT WAS ABUSED.
Respondents have claimed that the distribution
of the written statements to the Board of Directors of
the Utah League of Cities and Towns constituted a
qualified privilege because there was a common interest
in the subject matter.

The right, consent or necessity

of distributing those written statements to the Board
of Directors is in dispute and should be submitted to a
fact-finder.

Even if it could be said that some

qualified privilege existed, appellant claims that
respondents have abused that privilege.

The issue then

becomes what appellant must do to show abuse of a

qualified privilege and whether or not that issue is a
question of fact or law.
In Direct Import Buyers Association v. KSL,
Inc., 538 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1975), the Court said:
The malice which plaintiff must
show in order to overcome a
conditional privilege is simply
an improper motive such as a
desire to do harm. . .
Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 572
P.2d 395 (Utah, 1977), said that a qualified privilege
is abused where the publication arises from "spite, ill
will or hatred toward the plaintiff, or that there was
excessive publication motivated by a desire to do him
harm".
The question of the nature of proof of malice
and whether or not it is a matter of fact or law is
addressed in 50 Am. Jur.2d Libel and Slander, Section

Whether malice in fact exists
depends on the circumstances;
the determination as to whether
it exists so as to destroy the
defense of privilege depends,
or may depend, upon the form in
which the defamatory words were
put by the defendant, taken in
connection with the knowledge or
information which the defendant
had as to the matter of the
defamatory statements. The
question is usually one of fact
for the jury, but the existence of

malice may be determined by the
Court as a matter of law if only
one inference can reasonably be
drawn from the evidence. It is the
duty of the trial judge to withdraw
the issue of the existence of malice
from consideration of the jury,
where there is no evidence, or not
more than a scintilla of evidence,
thereof.
In this case, the very nature of the
accusations made by respondents suggest a spitefulness
or ill will against the appellant.

Respondents have

acknowledged that their statements were made to express
their hard feelings towards appellant.

For instance,

they have said:
Well, basically he was concerned
about all the bickering in the
office, all of the hard feelings
that had happened during the
convention, and he just suggested
that I write it down. (Michelle
Reilly deposition, page 5)
It was for Jan's record, just
about the individual. My
understanding was that everyone
was writing it so that he would
just have a collective — just
have reference to everyone's
individual feelings about Alice.
(Kenneth Bullock deposition, page 8)
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Just to put down my thoughts
regarding the situation.
What situation was it?
The Alice Alford situation.
What was the Alice Alford
situation at that time?
Just the problems we were
having in our office. (Carol
Kotler deposition, page 10)

All she said was that everyone was
writing down their feelings, just
venting it to get it off your chest.
(Jami Adamson deposition, page 7)
It was abundantly clear that these statements
were initially prepared by these respondents to air
their own feelings of ill will towards appellant.

They

were not prepared for distribution to a Board of
Directors or to support her employment termination.

In

any event, given the nature of the allegations
contained in the statements and the reasons for having
prepared them, there is a reasonable inference that
could be drawn that the statements go beyond the nature
of any qualified privilege that may exist.

At the very

least, it should be a question of fact.
V.
APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY
WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Respondents correctly argued that 63-30-11,
Utah Code Annotated, requires a notice of claim to be
served upon a governmental entity before bringing a
civil action.

Respondents claimed in their Memorandum

that appellant admitted that the Utah League of Cities
and Towns was a governmental entity subject to
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Respondents did not identify where appellant supposedly
made that admission and it is specifically urged here
that appellant made no such admission.
Appellant acknowledges that respondent Utah
League of Cities and Towns is a political subdivision
organized pursuant to the Interlocal Co-operation Act,
11-13-1, Utah Code Annotated, but all political
subdivisions do not fall within the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
At the time this action was initiated
(December, 1986) , employees or political subdivisions
who were engaged in nongovernmental activities were not
entitled to the notice requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act.

See Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165

(Utah, 1988).
There was no evidence presented to Judge
Wilkinson upon which he could make a legal
determination that respondents were engaged in
governmental activities, or that the termination of
appellant's employment was a governmental activity.
VI.
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE.
Respondents argued that since appellant

requested a copy of her personnel file pursuant to the
provisions of 67-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, she
therefore must have requested a hearing pursuant to the
provisions of the Utah State Personnel Act found in
67-19-1, et. seq. , Utah Code Annotated and, thereby
turned the Utah League of Cities and Towns and its
Board of Directors into a quasi judicial body which
then clothed them with the defense of absolute
privilege against any claims of defamation.

This is an

impossible stretch of logic and is not suggested by any
of the pleadings or other competent evidence.
Hurst v. Farmer, 697 P.2d 280 (Wash. 1985),
cited by respondents in their earlier Memorandum,
involved statements of female co-workers provided to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at the
Commission's request in connection with sexual
harassment charges filed with the Commission by the
plaintiff.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

has a duty under the Federal Civil Rights Act to
investigate complaints of sexual harassment.

Their

duties and responsibilities can, in no way, be equated
to a hearing that was to be held by the Board of
Directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns.
In the tape-recorded portion of the meeting on

October 24, 1986, there was some question as to whether
or not the League was even obligated to hold a hearing
and the League's counsel, in commenting upon this,
said:
I don't know what will happen if
we don't have a hearing. It will
be up to Alice and her people.
The wise thing to do is to have a
hearing and give an opportunity
for everybody to relate their side
of the situation and for the Board
to make its determination. This
hearing is not a trial. You're
not a civil service board. It's
a business decision that you as a
Board directing this organization
would make as a business decision.
(See Exhibit B, Defendant's
Response to Plaintiff's First
Request for Production of Documents)
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse Judge Wilkinson's Order granting respondents'
Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the matter for
trial.
Alternatively, the case should be remanded with
instructions to Judge Wilkinson that he identify which
ground or grounds upon which he relied in granting
respondents' Motion.
ADDENDUM
Attached is a copy of the Order granting Motion

for Summary Judgment.
DATED this
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day of December, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,
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300 South, Second Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84111,
on this f^

—~ day of Decembers 1988.
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, #2315
TODD S. RICHARDSON, #5010
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
2 61 East 300 South, -Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALICE M. ALFORD, an individual,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C86-9573

THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES AND
TOWNS, an unincorporated
association; JAN T. FURNER,
KENNETH H. BULLOCK, CAROL A.
KOTLER, MICHELE REILLY, JAMI
ADAMSON, JACK A. RICHARDS and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
individuals,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
On

July

8,

1988,

defendants'

motion

for

summary

judgment came on for hearing before the above entitled court, the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson presiding.

Plaintiff was represented

by her counsel, Brian Florence and defendants were represented by
their counsel, Stephen G. Morgan.

The Court, having reviewed the

file and the memoranda submitted by counsel for both sides and
having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in
the premises, now enters its order as follows:
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and
the same hereby is granted.

DATED this

n

day of July, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Homer Wilkinson
District Court Judge
IOVED AS TO FORM:

Brian Florence
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of
%

the foregoing Order on this the

day of July, 1988 to:

Brian R. Florence
Florence and Hutchison
Attorney for Plaintiff
818-26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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